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The Internet after Aereo:
How to Save Innovation from the
Public Performance Right
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court's decision in American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. overturned the Second Circuit's rule that
separate copies create separate performances without clarifying the
scope of a performance. The decision creates significant ambiguity
surrounding the public performance right and potentially massive
liability for cloud-computing companies. Since cloud computing allows
customers to run programs remotely from a company's servers, two
independent customers watching different copies of the same movie
from the same cloud results in the cloud conducting a public
performance. This Note examines this problem, concludes that the
current public performance regime has become obsolete, and proposes a
new bright-line safe harbor for cloud-computing companies based on
the fair use doctrine, dubbed the "Fair Performance Doctrine."
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In the 1920s, the La Salle Hotel offered its guests a new and
innovative form of entertainment: radio.1 Since radio sets were still
an expensive luxury, placing separate transmitters in each guest room
was unrealistic.2 Instead, the hotel received the signal through a
single "master radio" that was wired to each of its two hundred guest
rooms.3 The guests could then listen to the single radio station at
their leisure.4 Unfortunately, the author of the song "Just Imagine"
could not envision the new technology's potential.5 He argued that the
hotel was performing his song publicly and thereby violating his
rights.6 In Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., the Supreme Court
agreed and found the radio system to be conducting a public
performance.7 Since that time, American jurisprudence has struggled
to balance the copyright holder's exclusive rights with technology's
potential to optimize the user's experience.
More recently, the Internet start-up company Aereo tried to
revolutionize the way that users experience broadcast television.8
Instead of receiving the broadcast from a television antenna, Aereo
users could watch broadcast elevision anywhere with Internet access,
including through their laptops and cellphones.9 Since the broadcasts
were already free, Aereo argued that it was merely leasing a television
antenna to its subscribers, who happened to stream the signal to
themselves over the Internet.'0 Under Aereo's theory, the company
was only providing its users with the equipment o conduct a private
performance, not performing anything and certainly not performing
anything publicly." The broadcast companies, recognizing a threat to
1. See Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 195 (1931). Radio broadcasting
was virtually unknown at the time that Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1909. See id. at
196.
2. See id. at 195.
3. See id.; Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 51 F.2d 726, 727 (8th Cir. 1931).
4. See Jewell-La Salle Realty, 283 U.S. at 195.
5. See Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366, 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Jewell-La Salle Realty, 51 F.2d 726.
6. See Jewell-La Salle Realty, 283 U.S. at 195. The public performance right is one of
six exclusive rights that are bestowed on every copyright holder, along with the rights to
reproduce and distribute their work and to create derivative works. For images, there is also the
right to publicly display the work. For sound recordings, there is the right to perform the work by
means of a digital audio transmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
7. See Jewell-La Salle Realty, 283 U.S. at 202.
8. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 2504.
11. See id.
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their valuable retransmission fees, naturally disagreed.12 They called
the service a public performance of their work and filed suit.13 On
narrow grounds, the Supreme Court agreed with the broadcast
companies that Aereo was conducting a public performance and
effectively shut down the business model.14
While Aereo may only be a minor footnote in the history of the
Internet revolution, the decision in American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. leaves very important questions
unanswered, which could impede the development of cloud-based
computing. Cloud computing allows users to store data in a remote
database, known as the cloud, that can be accessed by any computer
with Internet access.15 While this technology may seem different from
Aereo's service, they are difficult to distinguish under the standard
public performance analysis.16 If users independently upload a movie
to the same company's cloud and watch the movie from the cloud, then
the company could be liable for infringing the public performance
right."7 This degree of legal liability threatens to stymie a potentially
new and important innovation.
This Note seeks to avert this problem by creating an explicit
safe harbor from public performance infringement for cloud-based
computing through the fair use doctrine while largely leaving the
public performance right intact. Part I provides background on the
development of the public performance right and its current state.
Part II examines the continuing viability of the US Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit's decision in Cartoon Network LP v. SC
Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision),18 in light of the Supreme Court's Aereo
decision. Part III explains the importance of cloud computing and the
threat posed by the public performance right. Part IV searches for
12. See id. at 2503-04. The main broadcast companies are NBC, FOX, and CBS.
Broadcast companies receive a significant portion of their revenue by licensing the broadcasts to
cable companies, who in return pay the broadcast companies retransmission fees. If Aereo's
business model had been upheld, cable companies could have used a similar device to freely
retransmit the broadcast signals. See id. at 2509.
13. See id. at 2503-04.
14. See id. at 2510.
15. See Michael Armbrust et al., A View of Cloud Computing, 53 COMM. ACM 50, 50
(2010) ("Cloud computing refers to both the applications delivered as services over the Internet
and the hardware and systems software in the data centers that provide those services.").
16. See infra Part III.
17. As will be explained in more detail later, it would not matter that the users watch
the movie at different times or in different places. As a result of the Aereo decision, it also would
not matter that they used separate copies. All that appears to matter is the users watched the
performance of the same copyrighted material from the same entity, in this case, the cloud
company. See infra Part I.
18. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2008).
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factors that can distinguish performances in spite of rapid
technological advancement. Finding none, Part V demonstrates that
the current public performance framework is broken and calls for
fundamental change. To protect cloud computing until such changes
occur, Part VI outlines a new safe harbor, the "Fair Performance
Doctrine," based on the fair use doctrine that will allow
cloud-computing companies to grow without fear of legal liability.
While drawing on current fair use jurisprudence, the new safe harbor
offers bright-line rules that will minimize uncertainty. As this Note
argues, the potential benefits of cloud computing far outweigh the
benefits of creative works. Part VII concludes with some final
reflections on the evolving role of the public performance in modern
America.
I. THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT WALKS OFF STAGE
Forty years after the Supreme Court decided Jewell-La Salle
Realty,19 copyright owners found new trouble in an emerging
technology they believed would threaten their public performance
right: cable television. With broadcast, television signals would be
sent from towers in major cities, but mountains and forests would
block the signals from reaching rural communities, leaving their
residents without television.20 To solve this problem, companies began
retransmitting the signals through cables laid to rural residents.21
Broadcasters viewed these retransmissions as a threat to their
business, even though the cable customers were never broadcast
customers, and alleged that the new cable companies were violating
their exclusive right to publicly perform their works.22
When the issue came up in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc. and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.,23 the Supreme Court analogized the cable company to a
broadcast viewer to uphold their services.24 In recognizing that the
public performance right needed to adapt to new technologies, the
Court analogized the cable companies to broadcasters and viewers in
order to resolve the case.25 In performing the work, the broadcaster
selects the programming, sells the accompanying advertising, and
19. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
20. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1968).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 393.
23. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
24. See id. at 400-02, 415; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 400-02.
25. See Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 392, 397.
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broadcasts both to the public.26 On the non-performing side of the
analogy, viewers use televisions and antennas to receive the signal
and convert it into video and audio.27  To the Court, the cable
companies acted almost like agents of the viewers by capturing the
signal and transmitting it to their televisions.28 The cable companies
did not select or edit the programming as a broadcaster and performer
would.29 To illustrate its point, the Court noted that if a group of
viewers worked together to connect their televisions to a distant
antenna, they would not be conducting a public performance.0 The
fact that a private company erected the antenna instead of a group of
viewers was not enough to result in infringement.31
Congress, however, quickly disagreed with the Court's
conclusion and rewrote the Copyright Act. 32 By passing the Copyright
Act of 1976, Congress abrogated the Supreme Court's decisions in
Fortnightly and Teleprompter and added the Transmit Clause to the
public performance right.33 The new Transmit Clause provided only a
superficial and vague definition of a public performance by
transmission.34 Instead, the Clause specified factors that cannot stop
multiple transmissions of a performance from being considered a
single public performance.35  A public performance includes a
collection of separate and otherwise private performances that occur
at different times and in different places.36 According to the Transmit
Clause, a public performance can also occur through any device or
26. See Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 404.
27. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 391.
28. See id. at 399-400.
29. See id. at 400.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). The
House Report accompanying the Transmit Clause noted specifically that a cable company
performs when it retransmits the broadcast o subscribers. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676-77.
33. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub norn.
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). For an excellent history of the public
performance right, see generally Sara K. Stadler, Performance Value, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
697, 704-28 (2008).
34. The Transmit Clause provides that:
To perform a work "publicly" means . . . to transmit or otherwise communicate a
performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) [the original
public performance right,] or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Courts have noted that the clause is "not a model of clarity." See Hearst
Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39 (D. Mass. 2013).
35. See § 101.
36. See id.
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process and can even occur when there is no evidence that anyone
received the performance.37 This definition leaves little doubt that
Congress wanted to prevent technological advancements from
sidestepping the public performance right.38  However, this new
definition leaves open a large question of which factor-and there
must be one-explains when one performance ends and another
begins. Courts have been struggling with this question, largely
unsuccessfully, ever since.
The advent of cloud computing again led to numerous clashes
between innovation and the public performance right. Cloud
computing allows a user to run a computer program over the Internet
from a remote computer server, known as the cloud, effectively
replacing the user's computer hard drive.39 The user can access all of
his files and programs anywhere in the world, so long as he has
Internet access.40 As the cable company Cablevision found out,
however, when a company replaces a typical household hard drive
that plays copyrighted material, such as a Digital Video Recorder
(DVR), 41 with cloud-based services, the result may look very similar to
a public performance.42
In 2006, Cablevision began offering its customers a service
called a "Remote Storage" Digital Video Recorder system (RS-DVR), in
conjunction with their normal cable service.43 The RS-DVR recorded
and stored programming exactly like a normal DVR, but stored the
recorded program at the cable company's facilities instead of inside
the user's home.44 Users accessed their recorded programs the same
way they selected a cable channel to watch, with their remote
control.45 Copyright owners quickly recognized the similarity to a
public performance.46  Since the Transmit Clause prohibits
distinguishing performances based on time,47 the same entity,
Cablevision, was transmitting the same underlying work to multiple
unrelated individuals, resulting in a public performance.48
37. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 135 (2d
Cir. 2008) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64-65).
38. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64-65.
39. See Armbrust et al., supra note 15, at 50-51.
40. See id.
41. DVRs are devices that record television programming on a hard drive at the request
of the user, to be viewed later at their convenience. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123.
42. See id. at 135.




47. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
48. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124-25.
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When the Second Circuit took up the case in Cablevision, they
disagreed.49 Even though the transmissions had the same transmitter
and underlying work, they each had one important difference.50 The
transmissions were each based off separate and unique copies of the
work.5 1 Since the RS-DVR recorded the television program from a
user's cable service, the user received a copy of the program that was
unique to his account, just as the user would with a real DVR. 5 2 The
Second Circuit held that transmissions created from separate copies
constituted separate performances.53  Thus, Cablevision was
transmitting a large number of private performances and not violating
the copyright owners' public performance right.54
Of course, the Transmit Clause does not explicitly distinguish
performances based on the use of different copies.55  But the
distinction appeared to fit nicely. Copyright law, as its name suggests,
has always revolved around the idea of a copy. The author has the
right to control the creation of copies of his work, but no right to
control the use or resale of a copy once sold.5 6 At first glance, this
distinction appears to make the public performance right fit nicely
with the author's other exclusive rights. The transmitter could copy
the work and then transmit the separate copies to separate
individuals.57  The use of separate copies would keep each
transmission private.5 But the transmitter would still be liable for
violating the owner's reproduction rights.59 While focusing on the copy
appears to create a clean distinction, closer inspection reveals
significant problems.60
49. See id. at 140. The US District Court of Massachusetts later followed the Second
Circuit's approach in upholding the service. See Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp.
2d 32, 38-39 (D. Mass. 2013).





55. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). In fact, the Transmit Clause does not explicitly provide
any factor for distinguishing performances. See id. However, there must be some factor, or
otherwise the occurrence of a public performance would depend on whether other people played
the same underlying work. Cf. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138-39. This would happen with any
work commercially sold, thus effectively eliminating any private performance and giving the
copyright owner legal control over all performances of his work.
56. The author has the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute his work. See 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2012). However, once an author creates a copy and sells it, the new owner may
resell it without interference from the author. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
57. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 137-38.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See infra Part IV.
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With this ruling in mind, a small Internet start-up called Aereo
set off on a doomed venture to revolutionize the broadcast television
industry.61 If the company used a separate antenna for each user, it
could capture a broadcast signal as freely as anyone with an antenna
and television did.62 It could then transmit that signal over the
Internet to its subscribers, anywhere in the world, for a small monthly
fee.6 3 Since each transmission used a separate and unique copy, each
transmission would be a separate private performance, at least under
the Second Circuit's jurisprudence.64 As a result, the retransmission
violated none of the copyright holder's rights.65 Needless to say,
broadcast companies did not like this new business plan.6 6 If cable
companies followed suit, they could retransmit the broadcast
television without paying hundreds of millions in retransmission
fees.67 If courts upheld the plan, broadcast companies threatened to
turn off their free public signal and move to cable, where their content
could not be picked up freely.68 The small Internet company quickly
created a high-stakes standoff.
Litigation began in the Second Circuit.69 As expected, the court
followed its earlier ruling in Cablevision and upheld Aereo's service as
a collection of private performances.70 Since each transmission came
61. See Sam Gustin, Disruptive TV Startup Aereo Is Winning in Court, TIME (Oct.
11, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/11/disruptive-tv-startup-aereo-is-winning-in-court/.
Aereo admitted to developing its business model to exploit the rules created by the Second
Circuit in Cablevision. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (J.
Chin, dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
62. See Gustin, supra note 61.
63. See id.
64. Cf. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 139.
65. Cf. id. at 139-40.
66. Cf. id.
67. The broadcast companies made $3 billion in retransmission fees from cable
companies in 2012, a figure projected to double to $6 billion by 2018. See Ryan Nakashima, Fox
Affiliates OK with Plan To Thwart Aereo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Latest-News-Wires/2013/04 10/Fox-affiliates-OK-with-plan-
to-thwart-Aereo.
68. One of the broadcast stations, FOX, has said it would have taken its channel off the
public airwaves if the Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit's Aereo holding. See id. DirecTV,
Time Warner Cable, and Charter Communications considered following Aereo's lead or buying
the company if the technology remained legal as a means to avoid paying the retransmission
fees. See Andy Fixmer et al., DirecTV, Time Warner Cable Are Said to Weigh Aereo-Type
Services, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-
25/directv-time-warner-cable-said-to-consider-aereo-type-services.html.
69. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom.
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
70. See id. at 689. The court also elaborated its copy-based test for a public
performance, relying on the four guideposts created in Cablevision. First, if the audience is
public, then the performance is public. Second, "private transmissions . . . should not be
aggregated," and therefore the broader audience of the underlying work or original performance
822 [Vol. 17:3:815
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from a different antenna, each transmission derived from distinct
copies, created legally, and could not be aggregated into a public
performance." Therefore, Aereo's service did not violate the
broadcaster's public performance right, and the company did not need
to pay retransmission fees to the broadcasters.7 2
Unfortunately for Aereo, district courts in the Ninth, Tenth,
and D.C. Circuits disagreed with the Second Circuit's approach and
found the company in violation of the broadcaster's public
performance rights.73 These courts noted that neither the text of the
Transmit Clause nor the corresponding legislative history required
that transmissions from separate copies be considered separate
performances.74 After looking at the plain meaning of the Transmit
Clause, they found no need to look further.75 The Clause emphasizes a
broad definition of "device" by referring to any device or process that
exists now or is later developed.76 Such a definition encompasses the
one-to-one antennas.77 Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more public
action than making a performance available to anyone in the world
with Internet access.78 Such a result appears to follow from our
fundamental understanding of the public and private divide, as much
as from the text and interpretation of the statute.9
The Supreme Court agreed with the plain text approach and
overruled the Second Circuit. 0 To interpret the Transmit Clause, the
Court emphasized that it is necessary to return to Congress's
intentions when drafting it.81 According to the Court, Congress wrote
the Clause to overturn the Court's decisions in Fortnightly and
is "irrelevant." Id. Third, an exception to the "no-aggregation rule" occurs where the same copy is
used, in which case the private transmissions should be aggregated to determine if the audience
is public. Id. Fourth, "any factor that limits the potential audience of a transmission" should be
considered. Id. (quoting Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 137). The test boils down to looking at who
receives the transmissions from a given copy and whether that audience would be considered
public. See id.
71. See id. at 689-90, 693.
72. See id. at 689-90.
73. See Cmty. Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1202 (D.
Utah 2014); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 46 (D.D.C. 2013);
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F.Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D.
Cal. 2012). The district courts in the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit actually dealt with a
different company, FilmOn, but the two companies' services are the same for all relevant
purposes. See FilmOn, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33; BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-41.
74. See, e.g., BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1145.
75. See, e.g., FilmOn, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47.
76. See id. at 48.
77. See id. at 47-48.
78. See id. at 47.
79. Cf. id.
80. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503, 2509 (2014).
81. See id. at 2504.
2015] 823
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Teleprompter.82  While these cases sought to create a distinction
between the broadcaster as performer and the viewer as receiver, the
new Transmit Clause made it clear that both the broadcaster and the
viewer perform the work.83 Both show the program's images and
make the accompanying sounds audible.84 Thus, any entity that acts
like the cable companies in Fortnightly and Teleprompter perform
even if they are merely retransmitting another entity's performance.8 5
Turning to the question of whether Aereo performs the work
"publicly," the Court again analogized to cable companies and one by
one dismissed the distinctions created by Aereo's unique transmitting
system.86 Users receive a personal copy created from a unique
antenna.8 7 But this occurs "behind-the-scenes" and does not affect the
"viewing experience."8 8  Since the statute specifies that a public
performance can occur by "any device or process," such behind the
scenes processes cannot prevent a public performance from
occurring.8 9 Similarly, the use of several transmissions, instead of a
single transmission, does not prevent a performance from becoming
public.9 0 To emphasize the similarities, the Court notes that Aereo
even has the same "commercial objective[s]" as cable companies.91 As
a result, Aereo performs the work publicly in the same way that cable
companies would if they retransmitted the program without paying for
it.92
Like the statute they were trying to interpret, the Court did
very little to define the scope of a performance or what makes one
public.93 Instead, it explained what would not prevent a performance
from becoming public and left the critical questions for another day.9 4
82. See id. at 2505.
83. See id. at 2505-06.
84. Id. For comparison, the Copyright Act defines the performance of an audiovisual
work as "to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
85. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2505-06.
86. See id. at 2507-08.
87. See id. at 2508.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 2509 (quoting Section 101).
90. See id. According to the statute, a performance is public regardless of whether
people receive it at different times or at different places. The Court noted that considering
separate transmissions to be separate performances would undermine this requirement. See id.
91. See id. at 2508.
92. See id. at 2508-09.
93. See id. at 2508-10.
94. See id.
824 [Vol. 17:3:815
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It specifically reserved the question of whether services like RS-DVRs
and cloud computing violate the public performance right.95
II. THE LEGACY OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S CABLEVISION DECISION
The major question left unresolved by Aereo is the state of the
Second Circuit's decision in Cablevision-whether services like a
RS-DVR violate the public performance right.96 On one hand, the
Supreme Court did not explicitly overturn the Second Circuit's
decision in Cablevision.97  On the other hand, the holding in
Cablevision turns on the use of separate copies for separate
performances." Since Cablevision used separate unique copies for
each user's RS-DVR, the transmissions from those copies did not
aggregate into a public performance.9 9 However, this appears to be
exactly the sort of "behind-the-scenes" technological differences that
the Aereo Court said could not prevent a performance from becoming
public.100 Moreover, the Court specifically noted that the use of
distinct copies could not prevent the aggregation of transmission for
the public performance analysis.101 As a result, it appears that the
broad holding of Cablevision, using copies to distinguish transmissions
and therefore performances based on the use of distinct copies, is no
longer good precedent.102
At the same time, however, the narrow holding of Cablevision
that would allow the use of RS-DVRs may still be good law based on
other justifications.10 3  Similarly, the Supreme Court's language
suggests some sympathy for cloud-computing companies.104  it
specifically reserved the question of whether these services conduct
public performances and also suggested that these services may gain
fair use protection.05 Regardless of the specific legal theory used, the
95. See id. at 2511.
96. Cf. id.
97. Cf. id.
98. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 138 (2d
Cir. 2008).
99. See id.
100. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508.
101. See id. at 2509.
102. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138; cf. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2501.
103. Cf. Aereo, 536 F.3d at 2511. The Court did not elaborate on what these other
grounds might be but explicitly refused to address how the new precedent would apply to RS-
DVRs and cloud computing. See id.
104. Cf. id.
105. Cf. id. Somewhat less sympathetically, they also appear to be punting the issue to
Congress. The Court suggests that "to the extent commercial actors or other interested entities
may be concerned with the relationship between the development and use of such technologies
and the Copyright Act, they are of course free to seek action from Congress." Id.
8252015]
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decision will probably turn on how closely these companies resemble
cable companies and the extent to which their services undermine the
author's ability to profit from their works. 106 Cablevision and other
companies that rely on cloud computing and remote storage systems
will have to tread carefully until this important area of law is given a
more direct treatment by the Supreme Court.107
III. THE THREAT TO CLOUD COMPUTING
Cloud computing is quickly gaining recognition as the next
major frontier in the Internet revolution.10s Cloud computing allows
customers, usually other businesses, to purchase computing storage
and processing as a service, like a utility, instead of purchasing a hard
drive as a major capital investment.109 The cloud-computing servers
are stored at a remote location and can be accessed from anywhere
over the Internet.110 If a company wants to start a website, they can
rent the computing power for the website instead of purchasing
physical computer servers.111 Thus, a large, fixed start-up cost has
become a variable cost charged only if customers arrive.112 The global
cloud services market was estimated to be $9.6 billion in 2013 and is
expected to grow 24.8 percent annually over the next five years.113 By
2019, more than two-thirds of data center traffic will occur in the
cloud.11 4  McKinsey & Co., a management consulting firm, predicts
that the total economic impact of cloud computing will range from $1.7
trillion to $6.2 trillion in 2025.115 While the economic size of cloud
computing is impressive, an examination of its potential will reveal a
much more powerful contribution to the technology industry and every
industry that relies on technology.
106. Cf. id. at 2501-02.
107. Cf. id. at 2511.
108. See Armbrust et al., supra note 15, at 50.
109. See id. at 50-51. The computer storage and processing power is stored at the cloud-
computing company's computer servers, which the customer will access over the Internet.
Normally, this computer power is rented on an hourly basis. See id. at 52.
110. See id. at 50-51.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See GARD LITTLE ET AL., INT'L DATA CORP., EXCERPT: IDC MARKET SCAPE:
WORLDWIDE CLOUD PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 2013 VENDOR ANALYSIS 3 (2013), available at
http://planetic.es/sites/default/planeticfiles/content-files/private/IDC%20MarketScape.pdf.
114. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY:
ADVANCES THAT WILL TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 63 (2013),
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business-technology/disruptive-technologies.
115. See id. at 61.
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The biggest advantage of cloud computing is not its ability to
generate revenue and profits. Rather, its biggest benefit is turning a
fixed cost into a variable cost for its customers, which are normally
web-based businesses.116 In starting a major web-based business,
such as eBay or Facebook, the company normally needs a large
number of high-powered computer servers that can host the activity of
customers using their website."7 These servers are similar to the
company's factory.118 They are expensive and go directly into the
start-up costs of a company-the costs that need to be paid before a
single customer arrives.119 Cloud computing, however, replaces these
servers and thus turns a fixed start-up cost into a variable cost, which
is charged only if and when customers start using the website.120
This shift from fixed cost to variable cost will facilitate the
creation of new revolutionary companies. Cloud computing eliminates
the need to buy massive computer servers and thus reduces the initial
costs of starting a new business or entering a new market.121
Therefore, it reduces the losses of a failed business and consequently
the venture's risk.122 Since you can never fully know if a business will
succeed until customers start buying its products, this risk reduction
will allow the start-up companies to enter new markets and create
dramatic change through direct experimentation with different
business models.123  Further, cloud computing is cheaper than
traditional servers.124 Cloud computing benefits from economies of
scale and can thereby sell processing power for a lower cost.12 5
Renting server space from a cloud costs only one third as much as
buying and maintaining equipment for the same power.126 It also
allows companies to allocate those costs to more efficiently match
customer demand.127 If a company operated off its own server, it
would need enough computing power to host the maximum number of




120. See id. at 53. Cloud computing is considered to be a "pay as you go" service. The
more technical business terminology for changing a fixed cost into a variable cost is to change a
capital expense into an operating expense. See id.
121. See id. at 51.
122. Cf. id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 52.
125. See id.
126. See MANYIKA ETAL., supra note 114, at 63.
127. See Armbrust et al., supra note 15, at 53. Adjusting the computer power rented from
a cloud can be changed in minutes rather than weeks and thus allows for greater flexibility and
for businesses to match costs with revenues. See id.
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customers that it expects at any given point in time.128 Since the
maximum traffic on a website tends to be two to ten times the average
traffic, most of the server power will go unused most of the time.129
Thus, companies with their own servers only use 5-20 percent of their
servers' power on average.130 In a cloud-computing world, however,
this problem does not exist.131 Companies only purchase the power
that they need and can simply purchase more computing power when
they need it.132 Thus, cloud computing can replace the upfront costs of
buying servers with a service that is cheaper and utilized only as
needed.133
Finally, and most importantly, cloud computing allows
companies to quickly scale up their operations at a rate that was
previously unimaginable.134  Since cloud-computing power is
purchased as a service, companies can buy more power as their
website traffic requires it.135 For example, Animoto is a company that
allows users to create web-based presentations from uploaded images
and videos.136 In early 2008, it served just 5,000 people a day.137 But
in May 2008, it went viral. 138 The site's user traffic doubled every
twelve hours for three straight days, totaling nearly 750,000 new
users.139  Since they were already based in the cloud, they
accommodated the surge nearly seamlessly, expanding from 50
servers to 3,500 servers in the three-day period.140 And they did it at a
cost of just ten cents per server, per hour.141 Anywhere other than the
128. See id. If the business fails to provide for the peak traffic, users will experience slow
response times and likely move to a competitor. For example, it is believed that Friendster lost
popularity to Facebook and MySpace because of its slow response times, which lasted up to forty




132. See id. To illustrate this concept, imagine an e-commerce website that-like most
retail businesses-sees its most sales and thus most Internet traffic leading up to Christmas. If
it uses its own servers, it will have to purchase enough servers to accommodate this high
demand. In this scenario then, the server power designed to accommodate the Christmas rush
will go unused for the rest of the year. Cloud computing, by contrast, eliminates this waste by




136. See Michael Fitzgerald, Cloud Computing: So You Don't Have To Stand Still, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/technology/25proto.html?_r=1&.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Armbrust et al., supra note 15, at 53; Fitzgerald, supra note 136.
140. See Fitzgerald, supra note 136.
141. See id.
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cloud, this would be an astonishing feat.142 The implications of cloud
computing is an unprecedented level of flexibility for businesses to
enter new markets and meet customer demand.
Unfortunately for the cloud-computing industry, the fate of this
revolution hangs on the opinion of nine Supreme Court justices, who
still have trouble using email.143 And right now, the ambiguity in
the public performance rights regime threatens to create major
legal liability for cloud-computing companies.144  While a public
performance may seem different from a cloud-computing company at
first, under the legislative definition, they are very difficult to
distinguish.145 The standard public performance analysis prohibits
distinguishing performances based on time or place.146 Consequently,
when two customers upload different copies of the same movie to the
cloud and then watch it independently, the cloud-computing company
is legally conducting just one performance.147 Thus, the two customers
have unwittingly made the company conduct a public performance.148
To use Animoto as an example, it is nearly certain that two users will
upload the same copyrighted movie clips for their presentation and
then play them off Amazon's cloud.149 Since courts cannot distinguish
the two performances based on time, location, or copy, courts
will aggregate the performances into a public performance, creating
significant liability for Amazon.150 Presumably, some factor must
prevent these two performances from constituting a single
public performance.151 But no likely candidate exists currently and
cloud-computing companies will continue to operate under the threat
of major legal liability until this issue is resolved.152
142. See id.
143. See Will Oremus, Elena Kagan Admits Supreme Court Justices Haven't Quite
Figured Out Email Yet, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future-tense/2013/
08/20/elena-kagan-supreme-courtjustices-havenitgottento-email-use-paper memos.html.
144. Cf. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).
145. Cf. id. Like Aereo, cloud-computing services perform copyrighted works for multiple
users, and these performances can only be distinguished because they derive from different
copies. Cf. id.
146. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
147. Cf. id.
148. Cf. id.
149. Cf. Mark H. Wittow & Daniel J. Buller, Cloud Computing: Emerging Legal Issues
for Access to Data Anywhere, Anytime, 14 J. INTERNET L. 1, 7 (2010), available at
http://www.klgates.com/files/upload/JournalInternetLaw.pdf; Fitzgerald, supra note 136.
150. Cf. Wittow & Buller, supra note 149, at 7; Fitzgerald, supra note 136.
151. See infra Part V.
152. See infra Part V. The two factors that currently limit the aggregation of different
performances would be ineffective here because the same transmitter is transmitting the same
underlying performance. See infra Part V.
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The problem is not just a theoretical one. The Cablevision
decision led to substantial increases in investment for the
cloud-computing industry, since the industry no longer had to worry
about copyright liability stemming from copyrighted content that
users placed on their servers.153 A study on the effects of copyright
policy on venture capital investments found that the Cartoon Network
decision resulted in increased investment by venture capital firms in
cloud computing along the lines of $728 million to $1.3 billion over
two-and-a-half years.154 While no one has yet studied the issue, it is
likely that the Supreme Court's decision has reversed this tide of
investment and its resulting benefits.155 Until the legal issue is
cleared up, it will slow down the cloud-computing revolution.
IV. THE NEVER ENDING STORY: DECIDING WHERE ONE PERFORMANCE
ENDS AND ANOTHER BEGINS
The broader question that the Aereo decision implicates is what
exactly distinguishes two performances.15 6 In a public performance
case, courts tend to use an aggregation analysis where they look to see
if a performance occurred, which transmissions are aggregated into
that performance, and finally whether the audience of the
performance is public.15 7 The difficulty comes in the second step of the
analysis in deciding which factors guide the aggregation of
transmissions.
Right now, there appear to be only two agreed-upon factors
that can prevent two performances from being aggregated. First, two
transmissions of two different works will not be aggregated.158
Second, transmissions by distinct entities will be considered separate
153. See generally JOSH LERNER, THE IMPACT OF COPYRIGHT POLICY CHANGES ON
VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN CLOUD COMPUTING COMPANIES (2011), available at
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/LernerFall201 1CopyrightPo
licyVC_Investments.pdf (presenting empirical evidence that the Second Circuit's decision in
Cablevision leads to additional investment in the cloud-computing industry).
154. See id. at 1. To reach this result, they compare the increases in cloud-computing
investment between the United States, where the decision would have a major impact, to other
countries, where it should have no impact. See id. at 7.
155. See Ali Sternberg, 8 Passages from the Supreme Court's Aereo Decision that May
Have Negative Implications for the Cloud, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT
(June 25, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/062514-8-passages-supreme-
courts-aereo-decision-may-negative-implications-cloud/.
156. Cf. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2508 (2014) (examining
arguments for what can distinguish two separate performances).
157. Cf. id. at 2504 (looking first at whether Aereo performs, second whether or not each
transmission should be aggregated, and the third element following implicitly).
158. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("To 'perform' a work means to ... show its images in any
sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.").
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performances.1 59 The statute defines public transmission in largely
negative language, describing what cannot prevent transmissions
from being aggregated.16 0 We know that time and place cannot
prevent two transmissions from being aggregated.16 1 Based on the
Supreme Court's Aereo decision, we also know that distinct copies and
separate communications cannot prevent aggregation.162 While the
guidance ends here, it appears obvious that some additional factor
must distinguish performances. Otherwise, every transmission of a
given work by a given broadcaster would be considered a single
performance. The remainder of this Part examines some of the likely
candidates.
A. Do Separate Copies Create Separate Performances?
For a while, using the copy to distinguish performances seemed
like a good solution. In Cartoon Network and Aereo, the Second
Circuit proposed to limit aggregation when the performances used
separate copies of the work.163 Distinguishing performances based on
the copy used has several advantages and appears to create a series of
rights that lock together, ensuring that the author will receive
compensation for their efforts. 164 From an interpretative standpoint,
focusing on the copy limits the audience without violating the express
non-limits of the statutory definition.165 Second, the author will be
compensated in each scenario, either for the public performance or for
his reproduction right in the case of a private performance based off a
distinct copy. 1 66 However, further analysis shows that distinguishing
performances based on copies creates more problems than it has
solved.
159. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 138 (2d
Cir. 2008). However, to make things confusing, it appears that more than one entity can perform
the same transmission, but for public analysis, these performances would be considered distinct.
Cf. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2500 ("Thus, both the broadcaster and the viewer 'perform,' because they
both show a television program's images and make audible the program's sounds.") (emphasis
added).
160. Cf. § 101.
161. See id. ("[T]o transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same
place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.").
162. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2502.
163. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498; Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138.
164. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 137-38.
165. See id.
166. See Jacob Marshall, Note, Trading Rabbit Ears for Wi-Fi: Aereo, the Public
Performance Right, and How Broadcasters Want to Control the Business of Internet TV, 16 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 909, 942 (2014).
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The Second Circuit based its decision on the assumption that a
transmission of a work cannot occur without a copy of that work.167
Thus, separate copies would lead to separate private performances
where the author has already been duly compensated by the
purchased copy.168 However, this is not necessarily the case. A person
can perform a work without ever having attained a copy of that work.
For example, an individual in a public place could begin singing
"Happy Birthday to You," a notoriously copyrighted work that almost
everyone knows by heart.169 Even transmitting a performance does
not necessarily require a copy of the work. Again, the individual could
sing the song live on a radio station without ever using a copy of the
work. 170
To illustrate the point, the facts of Aereo demonstrate that even
a digitally recorded television program does not need a copy to conduct
a performance.171 Aereo used a unique copy of the programming for
each viewer, but only because it recorded six or seven seconds of the
programming before sending it to the viewer.172 It would be easy for a
company like Aereo to not create any copies at all and simply pass the
broadcast signal on to the viewers.173 This is because a copy is created
only when the work is fixed.174 To be fixed, the work must be
embodied in the buffer for more than a "transitory duration."175 As
the Second Circuit found, this duration requirement is not met where
the work stayed in the buffer for less than 1.2 seconds.176 If Aereo
167. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 137-38.
168. See id.
169. Warner/Chappell Music owns the copyright to the song and collects about $2 million
a year in royalties. But see Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World's Most Popular Song, 56 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 335, 339-40, 360 (2008) (arguing that the song, "Happy Birthday to
You," has fallen into the public domain due to problems with the work's authorship and
copyright renewal).
170. Of course, the singer would still be violating the author's public performance rights
in both hypotheticals. The point is merely that transmissions and performances do not depend on
copies, and therefore a copy-based aggregation approach has serious shortcomings that could be
exploited in the future.
171. Cf. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom.
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
172. See id. at 682-83.
173. Cf. id.
174. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ('Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords,
in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. The term 'copies' includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.")
175. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 129-30
(2d Cir. 2008).
176. See id. at 130. However, other circuits have found the buffer of a work to count as a
copy despite its transitory duration. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
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kept a similarly short part of the program in their buffer, then
presumably they could retransmit the program without creating any
copies.177 In that case, Aereo would not even need to use separate
antennas to avoid infringing the public performance right under the
Second Circuit's copy-based jurisprudence.178 Thus, focusing on the
copy creates a gap between the author's reproduction rights and the
public performance right that can be exploited by performers to
sell performances without compensating the author. As a result,
delineating performances based on copies is a poor solution to the
current ambiguity in the public performance regime.
B. Can Ownership Distinguish the Performances?
In Aereo, the Court suggested in dicta that separate ownership
of the underlying work creates separate performances.179 As an initial
matter, this distinction would provide little help. Only the copyright
holder owns the underlying work.180 Members of the public own only a
copy of the work or a limited license to perform the work publicly.
Thus, the distinction does not go far in explaining where one
performance ends and another begins.
To consider a more interesting variation of this distinction:
courts might try to distinguish the performances based on ownership
of the copy. Under this distinction, Aereo performed their works
publicly because they owned each of the separate copies. By contrast,
a cloud-computing company would not be conducting a public
performance because it does not own the copies, which are owned by
the respective users.181 While this distinction has some promise, it is
still open to abuse by performers. Aereo has consistently argued that
511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that running a program on a computer's random access memory
(RAM) was sufficiently fixed).
177. Cf. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 130.
178. Cf. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 689-90. This point is assuming that the
transmissions could not be aggregated at all because they each come from the original
performance and therefore there is no copy. Conceivably, the court could interpret the
transmissions as all coming from the broadcaster's original copy and thereby aggregate the
performances.
179. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510 (2014). It is difficult to
understand what argument the Court is trying to preempt. If a person viewed a performance of
their own work, presumably they would be granting at least an implicit permission for the
performance, regardless of whether it is public or private. Cf. id.
180. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01[A] (rev.
ed.). Under any interpretation of the public performance right, the owner would presumably not
sue himself for creating a public performance.
181. Cloud-computing services usually say explicitly in their terms of service that the
user retains ownership rights in all of the content that they upload to the cloud. See Michelle
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they are merely "renting" their antennas to their customers.182
Consistent with this theory, Aereo could argue that their respective
customers own the newly created copies.183 As a result, focusing on
the owner of the copy may also fail where the copy-based distinction
failed.184
C. Distinguishing Performances Based on Volition
While dissenting in Aereo, Justice Scalia suggested that
performances should be distinguished based on who provided the
volition to start the performance.185  With Aereo's service, the
consumer provides the volition and controls what content to
stream, regardless of whether it is copyrighted.186 Aereo only provides
the equipment.187  Since consumers are independently streaming
broadcasts through separate equipment, no public performance should
result and certainly not one conducted by Aereo.188  Using this
argument, Aereo makes itself look like an Internet-based Radio Shack
that is just selling the online version of a common household
antenna.189 Since the user provided the necessary volition by clicking
"record," the user rather than Aereo conducted the performance,
leaving Aereo free from liability.190 While the majority rejected this
argument, it still provides an interesting alternative for limiting
performances. 191
182. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
183. Cf. id. While the Court rejected the "renting" argument for the purposes of a
transmission, the result might be different for those who own the underlying copy. For example,
Aereo might make such ownership right clear in their "terms of use" or adjust their systems to
save the copy directly to the customers' hard drives. It is not contradictory for a business to
perform or transmit a copy owned by another entity. Cf. id. at 2508.
184. Cf. supra Part IV.A.
185. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Somewhat oddly, Scalia
dubs this test the "traditional volitional-conduct test." Id. at 2517. However, Scalia is
actually the first person to apply a volitional test in the context of the public performance.
Cf. id. at 2513-14 (listing cases where the court refused to find the defendant liable for their
customers' copying because they did not provide the necessary volition). Instead, he appears to
have adapted it from Cablevision's use of the test to show that Cablevision did not create a copy
since it did not provide the necessary volition. Cf. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.
(Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008).





190. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Cf. id.
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In Cablevision, the court implicitly followed a similar
volition-based theory of culpability.192 In deciding who authored the
infringing copy, they viewed the RS-DVR system as analogous to a
household VCR.193 The person who operates the VCR is responsible
for creating the copy, not the party that created or sold the VCR.194 In
a similar manner, the television companies could not hold Cablevision
responsible as a direct infringer for the copies created by its
consumers using its system.195  The consumer, not Cablevision,
provided the necessary volition to create the copy.196 It seems clear
that the same volition that created the copy also caused the
performance to occur.19 7 Thus, it would be an odd and contradictory
result for the court to then find that the consumer caused Cablevision
to conduct a public performance.198  Moreover, analogizing the
RS-DVR to a VCR appears to buttress this result. Based on the
famous principle that similar cases should be treated similarly,199 the
distinction between housing the copy at the user's home or at the
service provider's facilities does not feel sufficiently distinct to warrant
legal liability. 200
The problem with this volition-based approach is that it ignores
the fair use nature of the original product.201 It is legal to sell VCRs,
despite their tendency to record copyrighted material, because
"time-shifting" programs constitute a fair use.202 However, a fair use
defense becomes difficult to justify when the means become more
efficient and a single actor is performing the service on a mass scale.
192. Cf. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 134-40
(2d Cir. 2008).
193. See id. at 131.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 132. The court did not deal with the issue of secondary liability for
Cablevision because the plaintiffs expressly disavowed it. See id. at 130-31.
196. See id. at 132.
197. Cf. id. at 134.
198. Cf. id. at 139. The court specifically notes that finding that the consumer created
the copy does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the consumer performed the work. The
court skips the question of whether Cablevision or the consumer was responsible for conducting
the transmission and therefore the performance, finding it unnecessary to answer since the
performance was not public. See id. at 134.
199. See generally Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1
(1974) (tracing the origin of the principle that like cases should be treated alike and assessing its
application in law).
200. Cf. id. at 9-12 (deriving the principle that like cases should be treated alike).
201. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1983).
202. See id. The Court applied the standard four factor test to determine that "time-
shifting" fell within fair use. First, private use is a noncommercial activity, supporting fair use.
The second factor, the nature of the fair use, works against fair use but the Court fails to explain
why. Third, the entire program is reproduced, undermining fair use. Fourth, there was no
demonstrable damage to the market for the work. See id. at 448-51.
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In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., two of the
four factors supporting fair use included the facts that the activity was
a nonprofit, noncommercial private use and did not produce any
demonstrable damage to the market for the copyrighted work.203
Under the facts of Cablevision, however, these factors would have
pointed in the opposite direction.204  Cablevision was acting in a
commercial and for-profit capacity in selling the RS-DVR services.205
Moreover, these systems have an increasing potential to hurt the
market for copyrighted works as they become more capable of holding
larger numbers of shows and effortless, since users may be able to
build libraries based on recorded television that replace their need to
buy copies.206 As a result, the viewer's volition theory of liability relies
on the assumption of fair use for a VCR-type system that becomes
untenable when moved to a mass scale.
V. CLOSING THE CURTAINS ON THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE REGIME
The difficulty with identifying a factor that can distinguish
where one performance ends and another begins results from a more
fundamental breakdown in the copyright framework. The current
copyright framework traces its roots to a time when copies meant
books and performances meant theater.207 In today's digital age, new
modes of communicating creative ideas have evolved; the performance
and the copy no longer have a meaningful distinction.
The paradigmatic public performance is an actor reciting the
script of a play in front of a live audience.208 Without the public
performance right, the actor could potentially purchase a single print
copy of the play and perform it for dozens of paying audience
members, night after night.209 Those audience members, having
already experienced the play, are then much less likely to buy a print
203. See id. at 449-51.
204. Under the issue of copyright infringement, the court never reaches the question of
fair use because they decide that Cablevision did not author the copies and because the plaintiffs
decided against arguing for contributory liability. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.
(Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2008). Also, of course, fair use did not impact the
analysis of the public performance infringement under the court's reasoning, since there was no
public performance. See id. at 139. However, the sense of justice embodied in the fair use
doctrine still appears to be driving the results in this case and the other cases discussed in this
Part.
205. See id. at 124.
206. See id.
207. See Stadler, supra note 33, at 700.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 718.
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copy of the script.210 In a world without a public performance right,
this profit opportunity allows the performer to appropriate the
benefits of the work without compensating the author. A property
right is necessary to fill this loophole.2 11
The search for a solution to this appropriation problem has
resulted in our modern copyright regime. The sine qua non of a copy is
its permanence.212 By purchasing a copy, the consumer gains the
ability to experience the work whenever, wherever, and for as many
times as they wish.213 In contrast, the sine qua non of a performance
is the one-time experience.2 14 When you sell someone a ticket to a
performance, you are selling the experience of the copyrighted work
with no additional rights after the performance ends.215  Each
audience member experiences the work once, without interruption,
and then it is gone.216 In the pre-Internet world, the distinction
between a copy and a public performance was rooted in the physical
nature of the act.217 Creating a physical object containing the work is
a copy.2 18 By contrast, creating a sound or transmission-technically
understood as a series of waveform audio or electromagnetic
distributions-is a performance.2 19 Thus, the distinction between the
author's rights grew off of a clear physical distinction.
Unfortunately, those clear physical distinctions have
evaporated. The line between a performance and a copy-between a
permanent object and a temporary signal-can no longer be
meaningfully deciphered. Any sort of Internet-delivered performance
necessarily requires a reproduction in the computer's random access
memory (RAM). 220 A reproduction and distribution over the Internet
differs from a public performance only by the lack of a
contemporaneous audio and visual rendering of the work.221 However,
210. See id.
211. But see id. at 700-01 (arguing that the public performance right today gives
copyright holders the ability to charge for their work in each step of the process through which
the work reaches its audience).
212. See Jonah M. Knobler, Performance Anxiety: The Internet and Copyright's Vanishing





217. See id. at 580.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 578.
221. See id.; see also United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627
F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a downloaded song is not music because there is no
contemporaneous perception by the listener).
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the same digital string of ones and zeroes leads to either a copy or a
performance based only on the software used to decipher them.2 2 2
With a small change in the software, the performance stays on the
viewer's computer as a copy, or a copy is simultaneously observed and
deleted like a performance.223
Transmitters have tried to maintain the traditional copyright
distinctions in their software.224  From a practical perspective
however, the transmitter constructs and controls the software located
on the viewer's computer.225  Indeed, the transmission is often
encrypted in a fashion that can only be decoded by the transmitter's
software.22 6 At the same time, the distinction is an artificial one and
will continue to break down until it is replaced.
VI. RECASTING THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE: THE FAIR PERFORMANCE
DOCTRINE
The doctrine of fair use allows "courts to avoid the rigid
application" of copyright law when doing so would "stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster."227 While creativity is
the main focus, the broader public interest is also important and can
tip the scale.228 Traditional fair use analysis relies on four factors: the
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect on
the market for the copyrighted work.229 Based on these four factors,
222. See Knobler, supra note 212, at 579-80.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 580.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
228. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 180, § 13.05[B] [5].
229. The fair use defense codified in Section 107 reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
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this Note proposes a four-element safe harbor designed to protect
cloud-computing services from public performance liability. The
defending company must demonstrate that: (1) the service did not
initially create or provide access to the copy used; (2) the service must
have a primary purpose separate from performing audio visual works,
such as data storage; (3) the performances must be essentially private
by resembling a series of private performances; and (4) the
infringement must be limited to performing the work, rather than
copying or publishing the work.
If a company is found in violation of the public performance but
meets all four elements, the company can assert the "Fair
Performance Doctrine" as an affirmative defense. Since each element
is derived from one of the fair use's factors, as will be demonstrated,
the company has effectively fallen within the fair use defense.230 If the
company fails one of the elements, then courts should proceed under
the standard fair use doctrine.
To emphasize the point, it is crucial that courts create an
explicit safe harbor because the fair use doctrine is notoriously
ambiguous and businesses need certainty to thrive. The fair use
doctrine's factors are defined in general terms that tend to defy a
bright-line definition.231 They have no relative weight and none of
them are either necessary or sufficient.232 As a result, judges can
apply the test arbitrarily based on their own sentiments.233 This level
of ambiguity allows a copyright owner, such as a major broadcast
corporation, to credibly threaten to sue a cloud-computing company for
copyright infringement and tie the company up in years of expensive
litigation.234 This kind of threat will be sufficient to deter companies
from entering the cloud-computing industry.235 Moreover, there are
substantial benefits to a rule that creates certainty, which the current
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). This Section was designed to codify the common-law doctrine of fair use
and not to change it in any way. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 549 (1985).
230. If the defendant meets all four factors of the fair use test, then "victory on the fair
use playing field is assured." Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1078 (2d Cir. 1992).
231. See Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012).
232. See id. One commentator called the factors "billowing white goo," while another
commentator called them "naught but a fairy tale." Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 596 (2008); David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales
of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 287 (2003).
233. See Monge, 688 F.3d at 1171.
234. Cf. Phillip Pavlick, Music Lockers: Getting Lost in a Cloud of Infringement, 23
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 247, 254-56 (2013) (discussing operational strategies that
cloud-computing companies have employed to reduce the probability of copyright liability).
235. Cf. id. at 277.
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fair use doctrine lacks.2 36 Certainty allows businesses to predict the
outcome of a legal dispute.237 It helps to resolve disputes quickly,
since parties will settle rather than attempt litigation.238 So, an
explicit safe harbor is necessary for the fair use doctrine to achieve its
purpose.
A. Initial Access or Creation
The first element requires that the service did not create or
provide access to the copy used for the performance. It would be
permissible for a customer to upload their own copy, but not for the
service to provide access to a cable or broadcast stream.239 This factor
derives directly from the fourth factor of the fair use doctrine, the
effect on the market for the copyrighted work.240 For the fair use
doctrine, this is the single most important factor.241 This is because
the fundamental goal of copyright law is to encourage authors to
create by allowing them to pick the fruits of their labor.2 42 If the use
has no impact on the work's market or value, then it does not need to
be prohibited to protect the author's incentive.243  The goal is to
determine whether the use appropriates the market for the original
work.244
If the service does not provide access to the copy, then the user
must have acquired the copy, hopefully by purchasing a legal copy.
Even if the customer acquired the copy without paying, the
infringement is his or her own and does not create liability for the
service.245 As a result, the service does not affect the market for the
work. If anything, these services should expand the ability of the user
236. See Paul E. Loving, The Justice of Certainty, 73 OR. L. REV. 743, 746 (1994).
Certainty in the context of legal rules can be defined as "the ability to predict the legal
consequences of one's conduct." Id. at 748.
237. See id. at 746.
238. See id. Certainty also allows the law to resolve similar cases in a similar manner.
See id.
239. Cf. supra Part I.C.
240. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
241. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
242. See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 642 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1124 (1990)).
243. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).
244. See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 482 (2d Cir. 2004).
245. The service may still be a contributory infringer if the customer is illegally copying
works; but that is a separate question and is beyond the scope of this Note.
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to enjoy the work, increase the incentive for the user to purchase a
copy, and thereby further the goals of copyright law.2 4 6
B. Alternative Primary Purpose
The second element requires that the service have a primary
purpose other than performing the copyrighted work. By and large,
the remote storage of data will suffice, while other purposes may
suffice as well. This element derives from the first fair use factor, the
purpose and character of the use.2 4 7 A use that has a commercial focus
tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.2 4 8 However, applying the
factor requires understanding whether the user stands to profit from
the exploitation of copyrighted work without paying for it.249 Most
secondary users will seek some commercial gain from their use, and so
it is important not to overly emphasize the commercial motivation
without respect to how that motivation relates to the copyrighted
work.250
In addition, courts have emphasized that a transformative use
can compensate for the commercial nature of the use.2 5 1  A
transformative use is one that uses the work "in a different manner or
for a different purpose from the original."252 Thus, the user does not
need to literally transform the work.2 5 3  The work can remain
unchanged so long as it is being used for a different purpose than
originally intended.254 For example, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc.,255 Google's use was considered "highly transformative" when it
used images to create thumbnails, even though it reproduced the
photos without altering them.2 56 The court noted that it provided a
new context for the work and thus essentially transformed the work
into a new creation.257
246. As a matter of standard economic theory, the more value that the customer derives
from a product, the more that they are willing to pay for that product. If the customer buys a
DVD and can only play it on their television, then the customer will necessarily pay at least the
same amount for a DVD that they play through their television, their laptop, and their cell
phone, as a result of a cloud-computing service.
247. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
248. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
249. See id.
250. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1994).
251. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994).
252. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Leval, supra note 242, at 1111).
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. 508 F.3d 1146, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
256. See id. at 1164-65.
257. See id. at 1165.
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In a similar manner, the service will have a transformative use
so long as the performance is incidental to the main service it provides
to its customers. Thus, the service transforms the public performance
of the work by adding private storage of the user's personal copy. The
storage function acts as a new context for the public performance.
Even though the service is creating a public performance of the work,
it is doing so to provide private storage of the user's private copy of the
work. The sheer idiosyncrasy of using a public performance to provide
private storage and the difference between these two concepts-public
performance and private storage-demonstrates vividly how
transformative this use is.
Importantly however, the service must demonstrate that the
performance is not the primary purpose of the work. An add-on
service used solely to disguise the public performance will not suffice.
C. Resemble a Series of Private Performances
The third element requires the services' public performances to
each resemble a series of private performances. This occurs, as with
cable and broadcast performances, where the users each experience
the performance in their homes or on a personal electronic device.
While this sort of performance would be considered public for the sake
of Section 106, the fair use doctrine, through the Fair Performance
Doctrine, one can still take this important distinction into account.258
There is something fundamentally different between broadcasting a
performance ihto people's homes and playing a performance at a
movie theater.259 In the earlier example, each space is a private space,
while in the later example, the space is public.
This element follows from the second fair use factor, the nature
of the copyrighted work.260 A work is entitled greater protection as it
comes closer to the copyright's core purpose of creative expression.261
On its face, it would appear that movies and television shows would
have the kind of creative nature that requires the greatest level of
protection.262 However, the nature of the use must also be taken into
258. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Fair use is an equitable doctrine that can account for
distinctions that cannot be easily distilled into rules or standards. See, e.g., Weissman v.
Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989).
259. When an individual watches a movie from a cloud computer, they are essentially
playing a personal copy for themselves. When an individual watches a movie at a movie theater,
they are of course viewing a public performance. However, this distinction is difficult to pin down
from a technical or physical perspective. See supra Part IV.
260. See § 107.
261. See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003).
262. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (noting that fair use is less likely to
be found when the copyrighted work is a creative product).
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account.263 In A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, the court
concluded that this factor did not undermine the fair use defense even
though the works were admittedly creative.264  The infringer,
iParadigms, had created a database of student papers to prevent
future students from getting away with plagiarism.265 Even though
the students' essays were creative in nature, iParadigms's use was
unrelated to that creative core.2 6 6  In a similar manner, if each
performance resembles a series of private performances, then the use
is farther away from the "creative core" of the private performance. At
the very least, the factor should be considered neutral and not support
a finding of infringement.2 67
D. Infringement Limited to Performing
The final element requires that the Fair Performance Doctrine
can only apply to performances. If the service acts to copy the work or
to publish or distribute the work for the wider public, then it cannot
receive the benefit of the fair performance.
The fourth element follows from the third factor of the fair use
defense, the amount and substantiality of the portion used.2 6 8
Generally, as the amount of the copyrighted material increases, the
likelihood that the use will constitute fair use decreases.269 The extent
of permissible copying generally varies with the purpose and character
of the use.2 70 In iParadigms, the court found that this factor did not
favor either party, even though the infringer used substantially all of
the students' works.27 1 The use of the students' work was limited in
purpose and scope to comparing it to other students' works.27 2 Thus, it
is important in this factor to take into account the purpose of the
work.2 7 3  Similarly, in Perfect 10, the court found that Google's
substantial reproduction of the defendant's photos was reasonable in
263. See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 640 (4th Cir. 2009).
264. See id. at 640-42.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 641.
267. Even if a court determines this factor to weigh against the cloud-computing
companies, the companies should still gain the protection of the fair use doctrine. This factor
tends to be less significant than the other factors and thus cannot outweigh them. See FMC
Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 539, 579 (E.D. Pa. 2005); see also 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 180, § 13.05[A] [2] [a].
268. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
269. See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003).
270. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994).
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relation to its purpose, to allow the search engine's users to decide
whether to pursue additional information.274 As a result, the court
found that the factor did not favor either party.275
In a similar manner, it is likely that customers will perform a
substantial amount of the work. However this use is reasonable
in relation to the use, which is to create a performance. More
importantly, the public performance right is just one of the copyright
holder's six exclusive rights.276 As a result, even though the service
publicly performs substantially all of the work, it does not appropriate
a substantial amount of the copyright holder's rights in their work.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE SHOW MUST Go ON
Through the course of history, copyright policy has evolved only
when threatened by new and evolving technology.277 The original
invention of the printing press, the first form of copying equipment,
gave rise to the need for copyright protection.278 The radio and cable
television similarly changed how Americans enjoyed creative content
and forced the copyright regime to adapt, but at the cost of awkwardly
projecting archaic distinctions onto new mediums. As America enters
the digital age, copyright law will again need to adjust the rights and
protections provided to authors. However, the digital world has
obliterated the distinction between a copy and a performance, and the
copyright regime must be reimagined from the ground up. In the
meantime, the cloud-computing industry will suffer the threat of legal
liability, potentially crippling a great force for innovation. To avoid
this problem, courts should construct a Fair Performance Doctrine,
based on the fair use doctrine but with bright-line rules to create the
certainty necessary for businesses to thrive.
Patrick C. Tricker*
274. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007).
275. See id. at 1167-68.
276. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing the copyright author's six exclusive rights of
reproduction, derivative works, distribution, displaying, and performing a song or movie
publicly).
277. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studies, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
278. See id.
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JENNY DIAMOND CHENG, Lecturer in Law
WILLIAM M. COHEN, Adjunct Professor of Law
CHRISTOPER E. COLEMAN, Adjunct Professor of Law
ROGER CONNER, Adjunct Professor of Law; Special Consultant on Public Service Career Development
THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. COOPER, JR., Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney General, State of TennesseeMATTHEW M. CURLEY, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass, Berry & Sims
THE HONORABLE ALLISON DANNER, Adjunct Professor Law; Judge, Superior Court of CaliforniaS. CARRAN DAUGHTREY, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle Tennessee DistrictC. DAWN DEANER, Adjunct Professor of Law; Public Defender, Metropolitan Public Defender's OfficeMANISHA DESAI, Instructor in Law; Counsel, Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis
LEE DICKINSON, Instructor in Law
DIANE DI IANNI, Adjunct Professor of Law
JASON EPSTEIN, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
WILLIAM H. FARMER, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Jones Hawkins & Farmer
JASON GICHNER, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Dodson Parker Behm & Capparella
THE HONORABLE SAM GLASSOCK, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of ChanceryJEROME HESCH, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Berger Singerman
THE HONORABLE RANDY J. HOLLAND, Adjunct Professor of Law; Justice, Delaware Supreme CourtDAVID L. HUDSON, Adjunct Professor of Law
THE HONORABLE JACK B. JACOBS, Adjunct Professor of Law; Justice, Delaware Supreme CourtMARC R. JENKINS, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate General Counsel & Executive Vice President
Knowledge Strategy, Cicayda
MICHELE M. JOHNSON, Adjunct Professor of Law; Managing Attorney, Tennessee Justice Center
LYDIA JONES, Adjunct Professor of Law
THE HONORABLE KENT A. JORDAN, Adjunct Professor of Law; Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit
DAVID A. KATZ, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
DOROTHY KEENAN, Instructor in Law
SUZANNE KESSLER, Adjunct Professor of Law
THE HONORABLE E. CLIFTON KNOWLES, Adjunct Professor of Law; Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court ofthe Middle District of Tennessee
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, Visiting Professor of Law; Richard G. Maxwell Professor of Law, UCLA Law SchoolALEX LITTLE, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bone McAllester Norton
WILLIAM MARTIN, Adjunct Professor of Law; Principal, Will Martin Company
CHERYL MASON, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice President, Litigation, Hospital Corporation of AmericaJOSEPH MCCARTY, Adjunct Professor of Law
FRANCISCO M1JSSNICH, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Partner, Barbosa, Miissnich & Aragao AdvogadosWILLIAM L. NORTON III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bradley Arant Boult CummingsJAMES A. OVERBY, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass, Berry & Sims
C. MARK PICKRELL, Adjunct Professor of Law; Owner, Pickrell Law Group
STEVEN A. RILEY, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
WOLF-GEORG RINGE, Visiting Professor of Law; Professor of Law, Copenhagen Business School; Professor of Law,Oxford University
BRIAN D. ROARK, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bass, Berry & Sims
BARBARA A. ROSE, Instructor in Law; Of Counsel, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz
LINDA ROSE, Adjunct Professor of Law; Founding Partner, Rose Immigration Law Firm
RICHARD G. SANDERS, Jr., Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Aaron & Sanders
PAUL T. SCHNELL, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
JUSTIN SHULER, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Paul Weiss
MONA SOBHANI, Law and Neuroscience Postdoctoral Research Fellow
WILLIAM M. STERN, Adjunct Professor of Law
J. GERARD STRANCH, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings
THE HONORABLE LEO E. STRINE, JR., Adjunct Professor of Law; Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court
CASEY SUMMAR, Adjunct Professor of Law; Executive Director, Arts & Business Counsel of Greater Nashville
WENDY J. TUCKER, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, McGee, Lyons and Ballinger
TIMOTHY L. WARNOCK, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
ROBERT C. WATSON, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Vice President & Chief Legal Officer, Metropolitan
Nashville Airport Authority
WILLIAM J. WHALEN, Adjunct Professor of Law; Chief Financial Officer, Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville
THE HONORABLE JUSTIN P. WILSON, Adjunct Professor of Law; Comptroller, State of Tennessee
THOMAS A. WISEMAN III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wiseman Ashworth Law Group


































































































EDMUND B. SEMMES JR.
WAYMAN M. STODART
JOSHUA A. SURECK
ROBYN C. TAYLOR
DANIEL S. WARD
ERIN A. WEBB
MALLIK N. YAMUSAH
KELSEY L. ZOTNICK
FAYE JOHNSON
Program Coordinator

